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Rabello: Renunciation of Right

RENUNCIATION OF RIGHT AND
REMISSION OF DEBT IN
COMPARATIVE AND ISRAELI
LAW*
ALFREDO M. RABELLO**
I. RENUNCIATION AND REMISSION IN COMPARATIVE
LAW
A.

INTRODUCTION

Renunciation and remission are not comprehensively
treated in recent Israeli legislation. And although the legislature
has referred to these terms in the course of its legislation, they
are nowhere defined.
The first reference to these terms, chronologically speaking,
is in section 1 (c) of the Gift Law, 1968: "A gift may consist of
the donor's renunciation of a right against the donee or in the
donor's remission of an obligation of the donee towards him. "1
The chapter treating "Several Debtors and Creditors," the
* Edited by Jeffrey H. Voight.
** Montesquieu Professor of Comparative Law and Legal History, Faculty of Law,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Head of the Harry and Michael Sacher Institute
for legislative research and Comparative Law.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Guido Tedeschi and concerns
one of the areas of law to which Professor Tedeschi contributed at various times. But is
there any field of Israeli civil law that Professor Tedeschi did not consider with the analytic clarity and the systematic approach that characterized his work?
The history of Israel's private law is inextricably bound to the guiding work of Professor Tedeschi. His research and activity in drafting laws and preparing comprehensive
commentaries paved the way for the new Israeli legislation. We who were privileged to
study under him owe our teacher a great debt.
I also wish to thank Dr. Hanina Ben-Menahem, Mr. Pablo Lerner, Dr. Renee
Sanilevic and Mr. Ram Shamgar for their assistance in seeking the comparative sources.
1. Gift Law, § 1 (c), 22 L.S.1. 113 (Isr.).
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Contracts (General Part) Law,s provides an enlightening reference to the terms under discussion. Section 55 (c) states: "If the
creditor discharges one of the debtors of the whole or part of the
obligation - by way of waiver, remission, compromise or otherwise - the other is discharged to the same extent, unless a different intention appears from the discharge."3 Thus we have before
us a list of terms (renunciation, waiver, remission, compromise,
discharge) that often appear in modern codes as factors that terminate a debt by means other than performance.
How shall we define the terms renunciation and remission?
Are we obliged to make recourse to English law? I have already
taken the opportunity to express my opposition to that method
of construction.· In interpreting new code laws, the commentator must interpret the law "from within the law itself." He must
define terms both according to their meanings in a specific law
and in other Israeli laws. According to the late Professor Zeltner,
the reference in section 55(c) of the Contracts Law is not relevant for the purpose of general construction, as that section "refers to waiver and renunciation in but a specific context, that is,
in the context of joint debtors."11 In his opinion, this context,
therefore, affects only the special rule of the effect of discharge
on one of the debtors. This objection would appear to be extremely formal. In a law that sets brevity as a goal, as does [Israeli] law, even a brief reference may serve to elucidate the legislative intent. This is particularly so when we may draw a general
principle by induction from the specific rule, as in the case
before us, from which we may learn by what means a creditor
may release a debtor from his obligation.
Today, after the enactment of the Foundations of Law Act,
1980,8 recourse to English law for the purpose of construing the
terms renunciation and remission is particularly problematic.
Rather, we should adopt an approach that would explain jurisprudential terms in light of the general systems of Israeli law,
2. Contracts (General Part) Law, § 55 (c), 27 L.S.I. 117, at 125 (1973) (lsr.).
3. [d.

4. Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, The Gift Law, 5728-1968 , in COMMENTARY OF LAWS
RELATING TO CONTRACTS 66 (Guido Tedeschi ed., in Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1979).
5. Estate of Finklestein v. Finklestein 22 (i) P.O. 618 (1968) (Jsr.).
6. Foundations Law Act, 34 L.S.I. 181 (1980) (Isr.). We refer especially to the section repealing recourse to English law as the basis of Article 46 of the Palestine Order-inCouncil.
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while showing a willingness to learn from other legal systems.
After all, Israeli law was not created ex nihilo, but came into
existence only after foreign systems were already in force (e.g.,
Ottoman and English law) and after civil code systems were extant in the West.
Therefore, in order to examine the terms under discussion,
we shall follow a comparative approach.' In so doing, we shall
also look to Jewish law. We will focus on the question of whether
we are concerned with 1) a unilateral or bilateral act and 2)
upon the issue of what approach would be most suitable for future legislation. We shall conduct our study in the light of the
historical development of Israeli law by examining the Mejelle,
Jewish law, English law, as well as other legal systems.

B.

MEJELLE

We find mention of remission of debts in Article 847 of the
Mejelle, in the chapter treating gifts:
If a person to whom money is due makes a
gift of such money to the person from whom the
money is due, or releases the debtor from payment thereof, such gift or release is valid, and the
debt is forthwith extinguished, provided that the
debtor does not decline to agree thereto. 8

We are here concerned with an act of unilateral waiver that
is realized by the will of the beneficiary alone, with the possibility provided for the debtor to oppose the waiver. Absent such
opposition, the debt is discharged.
In Book II, concerning "Settlement and Release," the
7. See Zeev Zeltner, Thoughts on the Draft Bill of the Contracts (General Part)
Law 5730- 1970 , 3 IYUNEI MISHPAT 121, at 132 (1973). It is well-known that Professor
Zeltner was one of the leading proponents of this method, at least insofar as German law
is concerned. But this approach is not foreign, within certain limits, also to: Aharon
Barak, The Independence of the New Civil Codification: Risks and Prospects 7 MISHPATIM 15, at 24 (1976); Uri Yadin, Again on the Interpretation of Knesset Laws, 26
HAPRAKLIT 358, at 364 (1970); Daniel Friedmann, On the Interpretation of Modern Israeli Legislation, 5 IYUNEI MISHPAT 463 et seq. (1977).
8. All sections brought here are as translated in C.A. HOOPER. THE CIVIL LAW OF
PALESTINE AND TRANS-JORDAN, Vol. I (Jerusalem, 1933), Vol. II (Jerusalem, 1936).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

3

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 1 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 3

42

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMP LAW

[Vol. 1:39

Mejelle makes specific reference to renunciation and remission.
Article 1562 is of particular interest:
If any person releases any other person from
any obligation, such obligation ceases to exist and
he can no longer make any claim in connection
therewith [see Article 51].9

On its face, the unilateral nature is clearly emphasized. The
debtor's consent is not required, though he may refuse to accept
the release. 1o If the debtor has already expressed his acceptance
of the remission, he may not later change his mind. However,
the opinion has been expressed that remission in Hanafic Islamic law resembles a bilateral act. l l
We have not found in Israeli literature or case law any widespread consideration of the questions under study. When the
questions have been considered, it has often been after both recent Israeli legislation and the Gift Lawl2 came into effect.
With new Israeli law in effect for some years now, comparisons with Ottoman law are rare, especially as the Mejelle has
ceased to be binding law in Israel. 13
9. [d. 2 Article 1562.
10. This was the view of Prof. Tedeschi, as well, who writes, inter alia: "Other than
the Mejelle, there is no law, either in practice or proposed, that grants force to remission
as a unilateral act". Guido Tedeschi, Repeal of Mejelle - Background and Timing, 2
IVUNEI MISHPAT 458, at 459 (1972). See also Guido Tedeschi, About the Gift Law 11
MISHPATIM 639, at 642 (1969).
11. CHAFIK CHEHATA, THEORIE GENERAL DE L'OBLIGATION EN DROIT MUSULMAN
HANEFITE 93 et seq. (Paris, 1969). This is the opinion of Chehata: "L'acceptation du
debiteur n'est point exigee. II semble cependent qu'elle est toujours presumee. . . La
remise est si bien consideree comme une convention qU'elle est assimilee a un contrat
translatif de propriete.. La remise peut revetir la forme d'une transaction d'une dette,
elle, n'est jamais possible que si elle est consentie au debiteur. Elle s'analyse alors en
effet, en remise de dette." (I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Yaacov Meron for referring me to Chehata's book). If this is indeed the case, then in Islamic law, as well, we
find the same procedure found in many other legal systems, emphasizing the consensual
nature of remission.
12. Gift Law, § 1 (c), 22 L.S.I. 113 (lsr.).
13. GUIDO TEDESCHI, REPEAL OF THE MEJELLE LAW, 5744-1984. See also id., The Centenary of the Mejelle, 25 HAPRAKLIT 59 (1969); Id., Repeal of Mejelle, supra note 10;
id., Le Centenaire de la Mejelle, REV. INT. DE DROIT COMPARE, 125 (1969).
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JEWISH LAW

The accepted rule in Jewish law is that remission does not
require a formal act of transfer (kinyan) but can be effected
orally.14 Nevertheless, in many places it was customary to perform a formal act or even to draft a bill of remission, though this
served for evidentiary purposes and was not conclusive. However, if a formal act or document was made, this could serve to
preclude a later claim of insincerity by the remitter. Rabbinic
authorities differ as to whether remission by document was the
same as oral remission, and some ruled that written remission
required the performance of a formal transfer, since drawing up
a document of remission and leaving that document in the possession of the creditor would appear contradictory. 111
From the writings of Maimonides, it seems possible to infer
that he held that remission constituted a transfer of the debt to
the debtor, as he states: "He who remits a debtor a deposit,
which he holds, to another... "18 The accepted view however, is
that remission is a waiver of the debt, not merely a transfer, and
that "remission is nothing more than the discharge of the servitude."17 In the Law of Acquisition and Gift 3:2, Maimonides
himself writes: 'If he remits a debt that he holds against him or
gives him the deposit that was deposited with him."18 In other
words, the accepted view considers remission a unilateral act by
the grantor. The sources do not directly consider whether the
debtor may reject the remission. In regard to gifts, the assumption is that the donee may decline the gift upon r~ceiving notice
of it. The donee's explicit consent is not required, and he is presumed to consent unless he explicitly expresses opposition. In
regard to remission, it may be said that the question depends on
the above two approaches as they relate to the nature of
remission.
Rabbi Herzog writes:
14. Maimonides 5:11 (Mishneh Torah), Law of Sales, Acquisition and Gift, 3:2.
15. SHULKHAN ARUKH, HOSHEN MISHPAT, ch. 241, § 2; 2 IZHAK HERZOG, THE MAIN
INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW 230 (3d ed., London, 1967).
16. Maimonides 5:6 (Mishneh Torah), Law of Sales.
17. Rashba 40:262.
18. Maimonides 3:2 (Mishneh Torah), Aquisition and Gift.
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Mehilah is not of the nature of transfer
(haknaah), but of mere withdrawal. That is, the
creditor does not in any sense transfer his right to
the debtor, which would, of course, automatically
extinguish the claim, but he withdraws his right
or revokes his lien from the debtor and his estate.
This deeper understanding of mehilah is not
without practical legal effects. Suppose A told B
that he waived the debt due to him from the latter, and B declined at the moment to avail himself of the waiver. If mehilah is viewed as a kind
of transfer, it has failed to take effect since B declined; if as mere withdrawal, it has taken effect.19

Given the prevailing view that remission is a discharge of
the creditor's servitude and a unilateral act, it is reasonable to
assume that the debtor's knowledge of the remission is unnecessary. However, we find in the Arukh HaShulkhan:
There are those who are satisfied with remission that is not in the presence of the borrower, if
it is a remission, and I am of the opinion that it is
remission... but this is when the borrower is informed of the remission and he intends to acquire
his money. But if he has not yet been informed,
the lender may retract, as every acquisition does
not apply to remission and that when the lender's
servitude is lifted, it remains in the hands of the
borrower. In any case, as long as the borrower is
not informed, the servitude is not lifted. 20
The approach of the author of Arukh HaShulkhan is in line
with the view that remission is a form of transfer of the debt to
the debtor, as he himself states. But it would seem that his attempt to apply the requirement of knowledge of the remission
even to the other approach is not successful, and Rabbi Herzog
questioned this in his book. 21 Indeed, the author of Mahaneh
Ephraim wrote: "It would appear that when he remits the debt
to the debtor, his servitude is discharged from the moment he
states his remission, even if the borrower does not consent
"22
19.
20.
21.
22.

HERZOG, supra note 15, at 229.
ARUKH HASHULKHAN, HILKHOT MATANA,

ch. 241, § 4.

HERZOG, supra note 15, at 232.
MAHANEH EPHRAIM, HILKHOT ZEKHIA MEHEFKER,
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As stated, remission is performed orally, but it can be inferred from the remitter conduct. The classic example is that of
a widow who does not demand the price of her marriage contract
(ketubah) for a period of twenty-five years after her husband's
death and who is, therefore, presumed to have waived her rights
under the contract. The responsa literature considers this question at length, but for our purpose, the conclusion that remission
can be inferred from conduct suffices.
D.

ENGLISH LAW

1.

Waiver

The term waiver has various meanings in English law. Lord
Wright, commenting on the vagueness of the term, stated:
The word "waiver" is a vague term used in
many senses. It is always necessary to ascertain in
what sense and with what restrictions it is used in
any particular case. It is sometimes used in the
sense of election as where a party decides between
two mutually exclusive rights. Thus, in the old
phrase, he claims in assumpsit and waives the
tort. It is also used where a party expressly or impliedly gives up a right to enforce a condition or a
right to rescind a contract, or prevents performance, or announces that he will refuse performance or loses an equitable right by laches.23
The most common use of the term in contract law is in
describing a situation wherein one party to a contract relinquishes his right to performance of a certain stipulation by not
insisting upon his right to its perfect performance, be it before
or after breach of that stipulation:
In the law of contract, however, it is most commonly used to describe the process whereby one
party voluntarily grants a concession to the other
party by not insisting upon the precise mode of
performance provided for in the contract, whether
before or after any breach of the term is waived. 24
23. Smyth (Ross T) & Co. Ltd. v. Bailey, Son & Co. 3 All E.R. 60, 70 (1940) (Eng.).
24. See 9 HALSBURY, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 571 (4th ed. 1974).
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The term waiver appears in various contexts, of which three
are germane to our study:211
a. In the sense of rescission, waiver may mean absolute abrogation of the contract,28 in which case consideration is required for
realization. 27
b. In the sense of variation, waiver is taken to mean a change
in a contractual obligation that is accompanied by· consideration
and is therefore valid. 28 The term also appears in the context of
variation: despite being supported by consideration, the waiver
is for some reason lacking contractual force. This is so, for example, in regard to the rule that a written contract can be orally
r~scinded but can be changed only in writing. In other words, an
oral variation of an existing contract is not valid. However, if
what is done constitutes a waiver or abstention from requiring
perfect performance of the written contract, then parole evidence of the waiver may be admitted. The distinction between
variation and waiver is ambiguous, but the accepted opinion is
that where a change in the contractual obligations and relations
is such that it changes the structure of the contract, then it is
not a waiver, but a variation. 29
In Hickman v. Haynes 30 the case revolved around a contract
for the sale of iron, which was to be delivered in the month of
June. The date of delivery was later changed at the buyer's oral
request. Despite the extension, the buyer did not fulfil his obligations, refusing to accept delivery. The seller brought an action
for breach of the original contract. The Court, in accepting the
seller's claim, ruled:
There was no fresh agreement ... which can
be regarded as having been substituted for the
original written contract. There was nothing more
than a waiver by the defendants of a delivery by
25. See GUENTER HEINZ TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 83 (6th ed. 1983).
26. Price v. Dyes, 17 Ves 356, 364 (1810) (Eng.): "The waiver spoken of in the case is
an entire abandonment and dissolution of the contract."
27. Atlantic Shipping and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus & Co. 2 A.C. 250, 262
(1922) (Eng.): "To say that a claim is to be waived is incorrect if a right has accrued. It
must be released or discharged by deed or upon consideration."
28. Brikom Investments Ltd. v. Carr, Q.B. 467, 488, 491 (1979) (Eng.).
29 .. 9 HALSBURY, supra note 24, 11 572.
30. Hickman v. Hayes, L.R. 100 C.P. 598 (1875) (Eng.).
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the plaintiff in June. 81

c. In the sense of forbearance, where the change in the original
contract is not binding due to a failure of consideration, or in
the absence of a substantive condition for the creation of an obligation (e.g., a written document) there still may be legal effect
due to the fact of waiver, as in the following circumstances: 82
A. The party that asks forbearance is unable
to refuse the change. For example, if the seller
makes late delivery at the buyer's request, the
buyer cannot refuse to accept delivery on the
grounds that the performance is at a date later
than that stipulated in the contact.
B. In the event that the altered condition was
performed and fulfilled, neither party may demand damages on the grounds of deviation from
the original contract.
C. The party that waives a right is obligated
by his waiver if he led the other party to believe
that late performance would be accepted. However, at any time before that date, reasonable notice maybe served and performance demanded on
the original date. 88
2.

Means for Effecting Waiver
A waiver may be expressed or implied from
[sic] conduct, but in either case it must amount to
an unambiguous representation arising as the result of a positive and intentional act done by the
party granting the concession with knowledge of
all the material circumstances. Furthermore, it
seems that for a waiver to operate effectively the
party to whom the concession is granted must act
in reliance of the concession. 84
31. ld. at 604.
32. TREITEL, supra note 25.
33. Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenheim 1 K.B. 616 (1950) (Eng.).
34. 9 HALSBURY, supra note 24, 11 574.
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It follows that if a condition for realizing the waiver is that
the party for whose benefit the waiver was made actually acted
in reliance upon it, then the waiver cannot be viewed as a unilateral act but as a bilateral, legal transaction.

An exception to this is the case where the condition waived
is to the benefit of the party who makes the waiver. In such circumstances, he may waive his rights without giving notice to the
other party.35

3. Release
Release is an act by which a party renounces his right
against the other party to a contract:
A release is an act of one of the parties to a
contract discharging a right of action against the
other which arises out of the contract.Be

The release may be made under seal, in which case no consideration is needed,37 or it may be made orally with consideration. An oral release without consideration is nothing but an expression of intent not to enforce a right, and has no binding
legal force. There are three exceptions to this rule, by which release without consideration nevertheless is binding:
1. When the plaintiff is estopped by conduct.

2. When a debtor is appointed executor for his creditors, it
is equivalent to release.
3. When a holder of a bill of exchange or promissory note

renounces his right by transfer of the instrument to the other
party with intent to release him from his obligation.
The rules for contractual obligation apply, as well, to the
means for effecting release. Therefore, it would appear that re35. 1 JOSEPH CHI'ITY. CHI'ITY ON CONTRACTS. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 825 (25th ed.
London, 1983).
36. 9 HALSBURY, supra note 24, 11 594.
37. Preston v. Christmas 22 Wils 86 (1759) (Eng.).
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lease is a bilateral, legal transaction. That English law requires
consideration for effecting release (subject to the above exceptions) supports the conclusion that it is a bilateral act in English
law. 38

E.

FRENCH LAW

The subject of renunciation and remission is treated in the
Code ciuil. 39 Renunciation of a real right can be effected unilaterally (Le., upon abandonment property becomes res nullius.)40
However, regarding the renunciation of a debt (remise de dette),
the French code explicitly requires that there be decharge conuentionelle!l The obligatory right can be discharged only by the
agreement of the creditor and the debtor. If the debtor does not
accept the creditor's renunciation, it is without effect and the
creditor may retract his declaration of renunciation up to its acceptance by the debtor. The bilateral nature of the act is absolutely clear due to the demand for the debtor's consent. Even in
France, there is no lack of jurists critical of this structure who
would prefer that there be a possibility for renunciation by the
creditor's unilateral act!2 But the accepted view is that, inasmuch as a gift is viewed as a bilateral, legal transaction, which is
based upon the agreement of donor and donee, there is no reason to change the system for the renunciation of debts alone,
which, too, is a form of gift.43
Viewing renunciation of debts as a form of gift brings
French law to the demand for intention de liberalite', animus
donandi: absent intention to benefit, there is no renunciation.
Therefore, French law does not consider renunciation a com pro38. Zeltner reaches a similar conclusion concerning English law, see 2 ZEEV ZELTNER,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 130 (Tel Aviv, in Hebrew, 1976): "In
such circumstances, there is a fundamental rule concerning recourse to English law that
renunciation and remission be effected by contract, a rule that, in English law, derives
from the very requirement of consideration."
39. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.) arts. 1282 . 1288 (Fr.).
40. 4 JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 514 (Paris, 1974); HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL.,
LECONS DE DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS 1101 (Paris, 1973).
41. C. CIV. arts. 1285 and 1287 (Fr.).
42. 2 GEORGES RIPERT & JEAN BOULANGER, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL 690 (Paris, 1957);
4 CARBONNIER, supra note 40, at 514; MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 40, at 1001. On the
theory of Juristic Act (act juridique) in general, see GEORGE WHITECROSS PATON & DAVID
PLiMLEY DERHAM, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 315 et seq. (4th ed. Oxford, 1972).
43. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 40, at 1107.
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mise agreement (concordat), whereby creditors waive part of
their rights. Because creditors do not compromise in order to
benefit the debtor, they believe that only this course will offer a
measure of satisfaction. 44 Many jurists have argued that a distinction should be drawn between remission of debt based upon
agreement with animus donandi, and unilateral renunciation of
a right deriving from an obligation. In their opinion, the object
of the renunciation in the latter case is not to benefit the debtor,
but to liberate the creditor from the burden of a debt that is
more troublesome than it is worth. This approach, too, is rejected because a contract is a legal bond between two parties,
and every matter concerning that bond is subject to the agreement of both parties. Therefore, remission of debt (remise of
dette) is a form of agreement. 'II
A further question is whether a remission of debt is necessarily gratuitous, or whether it may be granted for consideration.
Generally speaking, remission of a debt is by nature given gratuitously, as an indirect form of gift. However, there is the possibility for the remission of a debt to form an element grounding a
transaction for consideration. 46 This opinion is not unanimously
held, and there are jurists who argue that remission can be
granted gratuitously, as a gift lacking form.47 In our opinion, the
former approach is preferable. Renunciation can be granted either gratuitously or for consideration, and remission of debt can
form an element of a transaction such as delegation or novation. 48 The legal reality requires both forms of renunciation.

F.

GERMAN LAW

German law explicitly treats a "Contract of release" and an
"acknowledgment that the debt does not exist:"
1. An obligation expires if the debtor is re-

leased from the obligation by agreement with the
creditor.
at 1102.
45. 1 PIERRE RAYNAUD & GABRIEL MARTY, DROIT CIVIL,
1962).
46, 4 CARBONNIER, supra note 40, at 514.
47. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 40, at 1101 et seq.
48. 1 RAYNAUD & MARTY, supra note 45, at 853.

44. [d.
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2. The same applies if the creditor by contract with the debtor acknowledges that the obligation does not exist.·9

The language of the law makes it clear that the subject is a
contract of release. Thus, agreement - a meeting of the minds is required. The accepted view is that a debtor's silence is construed as consent to the remission of his debt,IiO but it is emphasized that no legal consequences arise from unilateral
remission. iiI
Remission is viewed as a form of gift. However, it can also
come about as the result of a prior obligation to grant remission
under given circumstances. Similarly, remission can form part of
an agreement or a more general transaction, in which case its
fate will be the same as that of the entire transaction itself.1i2 A
distinction should be drawn between the contract of release and
the pactum de non petendo (an agreement not to sue). In the
latter case, the obligation continues to exist, but the debtor is
granted a defence (exception) that neutralizes the creditor's action.1i3 In German law, too, a distinction is made between release, which is a contract, and renunciation. Release is viewed as
a sub-class of renunciation. Release refers only to obligations,
whereas renunciation is a broader concept that refers to other
rights as well. Ii.
E.J. Cohn clearly defines the distinction for jurists versed in
the Common Law:
As the doctrine of consideration plays no part
in German Law, German Law has no difficulty
whatsoever in recognizing the validity of a contract by which the creditor - with or without consideration - releases the debtor from his liability.
49. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] (Civil Code), § 397, (I.S. Forrester et al. trans.,
New Jersey, 1975) (F.R.G.).
50. 1 KARL LARENZ. LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TElL 217 (11th ed.
1976); 1 JUERGEN EssER. SCHULDRECHT. ALLGEMEINER TElL 179 (4th ed., 1920).
51. WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER. SCHULDRECHT 207 (7th ed. Berlin, 1985).
52. LARENZ, supra note 50.
53. See id. at 219 on pactum de non petendo; ADOLPH BERGER. ENCYCLOPEDIC DIcTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 615 (Philadelphia, 1953).
54. 2 SOERGEL-SIEBERT. KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 492 (1967).
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This contract (Erlass) is not subject to any form
(section 397, BGB). It may therefore, be implied
from the attitude of the parties. Its effect is the
immediate discharge of the debtor.GG
There are certain exceptions to the contractual characterG6
of renunciation in the laws of obligations; for example, the case
of deposit under sections 372 - 386 of the BGB.G7 That procedure concerns a situation wherein the debtor deposits payment
of his debt to the creditor's account in a public institution established for that purpose. The debtor retains the right to withdraw
the funds as long as the creditor has not given notice of acceptance of the deposit. The debtor's right of withdrawal ceases if he
declares to the institution that he waives his right to recover the
deposit. Ci6 This is an exceptional case which proves the rule that,
in the law of obligations, renunciation is bilateral. Ci9
Under certain circumstances, failure to exercise a right over
a period of years is tantamount to renunciation. 60 However, the
law always requires that there be both intention to renounce
and knowledge of this requirement. It must be clear to the parties, beyond all doubt, that renunciation of a debt is involved.
Another example of renunciation by conduct can be found in the
case where a divorcing couple drafts an agreement for the division of their property and later the parties remarry. The second
marriage can be viewed as a renunciation of the rights that
would have arisen from the divorce agreement. Certain rights
can be renounced only to the extent established by law, as in the
case of maintenance payments,61 or minimum wages. Lastly, as
renunciation of debt constitutes a contract between the creditor
and the debtor, German law establishes that a renunciation contract cannot be made for the benefit of a third party.62
55.
56.
57.
58.

1 ERNST JOSEPH COHN. MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 236 (2d ed. London, 1968).
PALANDT BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 397, 436 (46th ed. Milnchen, 1986).
BGB, §§ 372 - 386 (F.R.G).
BGB, § 376 (2) (1) (F.R.G.).

59. See also in the case law 722 RGZ 171; 110 RGZ 418.
60. 16 RGZ 1865 (F.R.G.).
61. BOB § 1360 (A); see also §§ 1616, 1615 (E) (F.R.G.).
62. PALANDT, supra note 56.
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SWISS LAW

Swiss law treats remission of debts as follows:
A partial or total discharge of an obligation
by agreement need not be formal, even where the
contracting thereof by law or arrangement between the parties required a particular form.83

It is clear from the Code's language that an agreement between the parties is required. Remission of a debt can be by way
of gift, but in such cases the requirements for gifts - other than
those regarding form 8 • - must be fulfilled.
If the renunciation concerns proprietary rights, Swiss law,

too, distinguishes between remission, which is a contract - a bilateral, juristic act - and renunciation, which is both broader and
unilateral. The causa for remission of an obligation can be either
of a beneficiary character (donandi), or of a normal, transaction
nature (acquirendi), as in the case where a creditor releases a
debtor on the condition that the debtor promptly pays another
obligation. 811
H.

ITALIAN LAW

The point of reference in Italian law is the "Declaration of
remission of debt," which establishes:
The declaration of the creditor remitting the
debt extinguishes the obligation when it is communicated to the debtor (1334), unless the latter
declares within a reasonable time that he does not
wish to avail himself of it. 88
63. Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Code des obligations, Codice delle obligazioni [Code of Obligations, OR, Co, Co], § 115 (Discharge by agreement) (Switz.).
64. 6 BERNER KOMMENTAR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN PRIVATRECHT. OBLIGATIONEN, 604
(Bern, 1941-1945); THOMAS GUHL. DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE OBLIGATIONSRECHT 268 et. seq.
(Zurich, 1972).
65. PIERRE ENGEL. TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS EN DROIT SUISSE 514 et seq. (Neuchatel,
1973).
66. CODICE CIVILE (Civil Code) [C.c.] art. 1236 (M. Betrams, G.E. Longo, and J.H.
Merryman trans. New York, 1969) (Italy).
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The traditional approach viewed remissione as a unilateral,
legal transaction. In other words, the creditor's declaration suffices to discharge the obligation upon receipt of notice by the
debtor, unless the latter gives timely notice of his desire not to
benefit from the remission. The opportunity to void the effect of
remission is given to the debtor as he may have an interest in
fulfilling his obligation. This interest may be not only a moral
one, expressing the common desire to keep promises, but may be
commercial as well. Not every debtor wishes to be portrayed as
unable to fulfill his obligations absent remission by his creditors.
Such a situation could raise doubts in the minds of other present or potential creditors. We have here another aspect of the
principle nolenti non fit donatio. This doctrine views remissione
as a unilateral act that requires acceptance (recettizia) and that
remains pending for a period, conditional upon the debtor's nonopposition. Opposition, too, is a unilateral act requiring acceptance that need not take a particular form. The possibility of a
declaration of opposition does not, according to the traditional
view, change the nature of remission from a unilateral act to a
bilateral one _. a contract. The result of the debtor's refusal is
the revival of the original contract, but without those guarantees
that existed prior to the remission and which automatically
ceased upon the discharge of the primary contractual relationship. As stated, this is the approach of traditional doctrine,S7 as
well as of the case law. s8
However, this approach has, in the past, been subjected to
the criticism of important jurists,69 and this criticism has gained
strength. It is argued that one cannot create an abstract structure for remission, since remission occurs at several different
times: sometimes in accordance with the structure of article
1236, which is a particular contractual form (particolare forma
67. Ernesto Tilocca, Remissione del debito, in 15 NOVISSIMO DIGESTO ITALIANO 389
et seq. (Torino, 1968); ALBERTO TRABUCCHI, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO CIVILE 571 (27th ed.
Padova, 1985); PIETRO RESCIGNO, MANUALE DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO ITALIANO 632 et seq.
(Napoli, 1985).
68. See Judgment of May 10,1967 Casso n. 959 (according to which the result of
acceptance is to make the remission irrevocable); See also, Judgment of June 24, 1968
Casso n. 2111 (attributes the same result to the passage of reasonable time without the
debtor's opposition) (Italy).
69. GIUESEPPE STOLFI. TEORIA DEL NEGOZIO GIURIDICO 50 et seq. (Padova, 1947);
FRANCESCO CARIOTA FERRARA, IL NEGOZIO GIURIDICO 140 et seq. (Milano, 1948); EMILIO
BETTI. TEORIA GENERALE DEL NEGOZIO GIURIDICO 293 (Torino, 1950).
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contrattuale}; at times in the traditional contractual form; and

at other times as a unilateral act, which does not require any
steps be taken by the debtor, if the parties have so agreed in
advance and have so empowered the creditor.70 The relationship
between remission and renunciation (rinuncia) , too, has given
rise to differences of opinion,71 though this is beyond the scope
of our present study.
I.

SPANISH LAW

In the Spanish code, we find reference only to remission,72
with a distinction drawn between explicit remission (the creditor
makes a formal declaration), and implied remission (for which
the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the creditor waives
his right}.73 When a note is held by the debtor, it is presumed
that the note has been freely transferred to him by the creditor,
unless otherwise proven. 74 It is also presumed that the free
transfer of a note was performed by way of remission, and not
for consideration. 75
Remission is considered to be a legal transaction performed
without consideration,'6 and the laws of gifts apply.77
In Spain, too, the question has been raised as to whether
70. PIETRO PERLINGIERI, REMISSIONE DEL DEBITO E RINUNCIA AL CREDITO (Napoli,

1968); See his MODI DI ESTINZIONE DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI DIVERSI DALL'ADEMPIMENTO,168 et
seq. (Bologna. 1975).
71. See Tilocca, supra note 67, for a discussion of the problems and references to
the opposing literature.
72. C6digo Civil (Civil Code) [C.CIV.J, arts. 1187-1194 (Spain): "De la Condonacion
de la deuda". The doctrine also employs other terms, such as Quita, Remision,
Renuncia. See 3 JOSE CASTAN TOBEN AS, DERECHO CIVIL ESPAGNOL COMUN Y FORAL, 393
(Reus ed., Madrid, 1978).
73. See 3 TOBENAs, supra note 72, at 397. As, for example, delivering the promissory
note to the debtor (C.CIV. art. 1187, § 1 (Spain)) or delivering the security interest,
though in this case the remission is only of the right to hold the security interest and not
of the debt itself.
74. C.CIV. art. 1189 (Spain).
75. See C.Civ. art. 1188 (Spain). This system of presumptions has been subject to
criticism under the doctrine, see 3 TOBENAs supra note 72, loco cit. See also infra the
section concerning the Argentinean code.
76. See 1 JOSE PUIG BRUTAu, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL 364 (Barcelona, 1959).
This scholar objects to the very notion of remission for consideration. In his opinion, it is
the absence of consideration that characterizes remission.
77. C.CIV. art. 1187 (Spain).
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remission is a unilateral or a bilateral act. Ruggiero is of the
opinion that remission is unilateral and, therefore, the creditor's
intent is sufficient to discharge the obligation. The debtor cannot prevent the remission, and not every remission is to the
debtor's benefit.78 According to Sanchez Rebullido, only explicit
remission requires the debtor's consent and, therefore, such
remission is a bilateral act.79
But there are jurists who argue that the question has been
improperly posed. According to Puig Brutau, it is irrelevant to
establish, a priori, whether remission is unilateral or bilateral:
the question is whether the creditor may withdraw the remission. In Brutau's opinion, where the creditor has unambiguously
declared his intent to remit a particular debt, he may not withdraw the remission. 80 Therefore, remission is unilateral in character, ensuring the debtor's interest and faith. But the fact that
the law applies the rules of gifts to remission, including the requirement of consent81 is sufficient - in the opinion of Castan
Tobenas - to establish that remission is bilateraP2 Moreover, according to articles 632 and 633 of the Spanish code, the debtor's
consent must be given in writing. 83 In the case law, we find a
strict approach to this requirement. The Supreme Court, in a
decision from November 21, 1935, held that unless the debtor
consents, remission cannot be inferred from the fact that the
creditor sent a letter of waiver and did not act to collect for a
period of thirteen years. Therefore, the Court allowed the creditor to withdraw his remission. 84
78. See 3 TOBENAS, supra note 72, at 394.
79. [d.
80. See 1 BRUTAU, supra note 76, at 362-363.
81. C.CIV. arts. 618 and 629 (Spain).
82. See 1 BRUTAU, supra note 78, at 363. According to Puig Brutau, this assertion is
quite weak. The consent of the other party does not characterize remission, because even
absent consent the remission will be valid as an 'implied remission."
83. C.CIV. art. 632-33 (Spain). Article 632 establishes that a gift of chattels requires
the consent of the donee as long as the transfer of the object is not made simultaneously.
Under article 633, a gift of real property requires a notarized protocol. The donee may
express his consent in that protocol or in a separate protocol.
84. See the decision in LEON MEDINA y MARANON, LEYES CIVILES DE ESPANA 338
(Reus ed., Madrid, 1943). See criticism of this decision in 1 BRUTAU, supra note 76, at
367 and in 3 TOBEN AS, supra note 72, at 395.
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LATIN AMERICAN LAWS

We shall now briefly review the codes of Latin America. It
was to these codes that Prof. Tedeschi referred the Israeli legislature for a desirable model of "legal technique:"
. . . it is worthwhile considering whether it
would not be wiser to adopt a more precise technique, such as is characteristic, for instance, of a
number of South American codes, especially since
a number of well-known European jurists tend to
prefer this technique for various reasons.st!

In general, Latin American laws do not distinguish between
renunciation and remission, often considering them one and the
same. 86 In several countries, such as Chile 87 and Uruguay,88 a
distinction is drawn between an explicit remission and an implied remission, performed by handing over or destroying a note.
Other countries, such as Brazil,89 Venezuela90 and the Dominican Republic,91 treat only implied remission.
In our brief discussion, we focus on Argentinean law, which
clearly distinguishes between renunciation and remission. 92 In
Argentina, renunciation is defined as a legal transaction,
whereby a person holding a right (personal, proprietary, or intellectual) abandons it. Remission is a particular form of renunciation that relates to a creditor's rights alone. 93 Here, too, we find
scholars seeking to refine this distinction. They urge a differentiation between 1) renunciation in the broad sense, wherein a person completely renounces his right (in tatum), and 2) renunciation in the narrow sense, as where a person waives timely
85. Guido Tedeschi, On the Technique of the Future Legislation in Israel, in
STUDIES IN ISRAEL LAW 69, 81 (Jerusalem, 1960).
86. See C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal [C.C.D.F.] (Civil Code) § 2209 (Mex.).
C6digo Civil (Civil Code) § 1515 (Uru.).
87. COdigo Civil [C6D. CIV.} (Civil Code) § 1654 (Chile).
88. C6digo Civil [C.C.] (Civil Code) § 1517 (Uru.).
89. C6digo Civil [C.C.} (Civil Code) § 1053 (Braz.).
90. C6digo Civil [C.C.] (Civil Code) § 1326 (Venez.).
91. C6digo Civil [C.C.] (Civil Code) § 1282 (Dom. Rep.).
92. C6digo Civil [C6D. CIV.] (Civil Code) §§ 868-887 (Arg.). See §§ 868-875 for renunciation and §§ 876-887 for remission.
93. GIORGIO BORDA. MANUAL DE OBLIGACIONES 377, 382 (Buenos Aires, 1974).
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performance of an obligation. In the latter case, we have but an
extension of the date of performance, and not a waiver of the
right itself. Renunciation of a debt falls within the framework of
renunciation in the broad sense. 9•
In Argentina, as well, renunciation is considered a bilateral,
legal transaction, as the debtor's consent is required. 911 Renunciation can be made either for consideration or gratuitously.96 In
the latter case, the question of the relationship between renunciation and gift arises. The accepted view is that by giving a gift,
one transfers ownership of property,97 where as renunciation encompasses every transfer, even abandonment. Indeed, because it
is often difficult in day-to-day practice to distinguish between
gift and renunciation, various proposed amendments to the code
would expand the definition of gift to include renunciation. 98
Due to the bilateral nature of renunciation, the renouncing party
may withdraw his renunciation as long as there has been no acceptance by the debtor. But this is subject to the proviso that
the withdrawal not harm third-party interests, which arise between the date of renunciation and the date of withdrawa1. 99
In Argentinean law there is no presumption of renunciation.
Therefore, we may speak of a renunciation only when we encounter a formal declaration or an unambiguous fact.loo
Like renunciation, remission may be general or partial, and
either for consideration or gratuitous. When remission is used in
the general sense, it refers to an act done without consideration: lol a wilful or necessary act, such as remission in the course
of receivership. Remission can be explicit or implied. Contrary
94. 2 JosE J. LLAMBIAS. C6D1GO CIYIL ANOTADO 857 (Buenos Aires, 1978).
95. C6D. CIY. § 868 (Arg.). However in the case of renunciation of proprietary rights
it is a unilateral act. BORDA, supra note 93, at 378.
96. C6D. CIY. § 869 (Arg.).
97. C6D. CIY. §1789 (Arg.).
98. Thus it may be that there is no difference between 1) A giving B a sum of money
as a gift and 2) A lending money to B , only later to waive his right to repayment: BORDA,
supra note 93, at 381; JosE J. LLAMBIAS ET AL .. COMPENDIO DE DERECHO CIVIL, 535 (Buenos Aires, 1976).
99. The same rule appears in regard to gifts: C6D. CIY. §1789 (Arg.).
100. See the case law brought in 2 LLAMBIAS, supra note 94, at 872.
101. In Argentina, as in many other countries, doctrine basically claims that remission can be only gratuitous. Where there is consideration, we may speak in terms such as
transaction, novation, or datio in solutum.
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to other jurisdictions, such as Chile, explicit remission in Argentina need not be made in ceremonial form, even when the debt
has been drawn up in a notarized protoco1. 102
The Argentinean code itself gives an example of implied remission: the creditor gives the note to the debtor of his own free
will, so long as the debtor does not claim that the debt has already been discharged. l03 Another presumption in Argentinean
law is that if the note is in the possession of the debtor, then it
is presumed to have been given to him of the creditor's free
will. 104
K.

THE NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE

The bilateral character of remission of debts finds expression in the new Netherlands Civil Code. 1011 In Extinction of Obligations we find:
1. An obligation lapses if the creditor makes
an offer to his debtor to renounce it, and the latter accepts that offer.
2. A gratuitous offer to renounce (remission
of debt), which has come to the knowledge of the
debtor and has not been refused forthwith, is
deemed to be accepted. 108

The commentary specifically addresses the distinction between renunciation and remission:
It is not clear whether the word "remission"
in articles 1474 et. seq. of the existing code denotes every renunciation of a claim, or only gratu102. C6D. CIV. § 885 (Arg.).
103. Clearly, this example does not rule out the possibility of other cases of implied
remission.
104. C6D. CIV. § 878 (Arg.)., which is based upon § 1282 of the Napoleonic Code.
The norm had already been the subject of criticism in France: see 2 RIPERT & Bou·
LANGER, supra note 42, at 692. In Argentina, it was recommended that both presump·
tions be repealed, and that the rules of renunciation and remission be unified. See 3 JosE
J. LLAMBIAS, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL, OBLIGACIONES 171 (Buenos Aires, 1977).
105. NEW NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE, PATRIMONIAL LAW, bk. 6 (Deventer/Boston,
1992).
106. [d. bk. 6.1, § 10 (Neth.).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

21

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 1 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 3

60

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMP LAW

[Vol. 1:39

itous renunciation. In order to exclude any possible misunderstanding, the draft uses the word
"renunciation" for every juristic act whereby a
creditor relinquishes his claim, and, in accordance
with common usage, the word 'remission' is used
to denote gratuitous renunciation only.
According to some legislation, a simple declaration by the creditor that he renounces his claim
is sufficient to cause the obligation to lapse. The
draft has not adopted that view, because it should
not be possible to thrust upon another person
gifts which he does not want to accept from the
donor. However, if the statute were to provide, as
some other codes do, that a contract between
creditor and debtor is required for every renunciation, then that would suggest that mutual consent must be proved in all cases. This would go
too far in the other direction; for cases where the
debtor objects to remission occur so rarely that
the absence of any reaction may be interpreted as
an assent. The proposed article therefore provides
that an offer of remission which has come to the
knowledge of the debtor, and has not been rejected by him forthwith, is deemed to be accepted. The rule promotes legal security, because
it cuts off any dispute on whether the debtor has
consented to the remission or not. 107

In the new Code we find renunciation by contract (1) and
the presumption of agreement of the debtor (2):
Art. 160 (6.2.4.14a)
(1) An obligation is exstinguished by a contract
between creditor and debtor whereby the creditor
renounces his claim.
(2) An offer to renunciate by gratuitious title, addressed by the creditor to the debtor, is deemed
accepted when it has come to the attention of the
debtor and he has not rejected it without delay.

107. [d. Text at 36, and Commentary at 234.
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II.

RENUNCIATION AND REMISSION IN ISRAELI LAW

A.

INTRODUCTION

We have not conducted the foregoing comparative survey in
order to indicate any particular foreign solution, nor to find the
source from which the Israeli legislature directly or indirectly
drew its legal principles. We accept the principle that "in the
new Israeli legislation, there is no such direct-technical absorption, but only a general, indirect-conceptual relationship to foreign legal systems. "lOS
In treating this question, Professor Barak writes:
Even in the framework of "operative" jurisprudence, we are not forbidden - and it appears
to us as desirable - to turn to the foreign system
from which the primary concept was drawn. Such
recourse extends the depth of thought and can
expand the options for construction. But it is not
essentia1. 109

In light of the above, we shall return to our legal system.
It seems clear that by the term vitur, the Israeli legislature
means renunciation, and by mehilah it means remission of debt,
just as those terms were translated in the Ministry of Justice's
authorized translation of the Gift Law, 1968. 110 As we have seen,
these terms are well-known in the legislation and literature of
those countries that have adopted a code system. What system
has been adopted by the Israeli legislature? It seems clear that
the legislature considered cases of renunciation and of remission
made in the form of agreements: '[a] gift is completed by the
donor transferring to the donee the ownership of the subject of
the gift, while it is agreed between them that such subject is disposed by way of gift;"lll and '[t]he donee is presumed to have
108. Yadin, supra note 7, at 365.
109. Barak, supra note 7, at 21.
110. As stated above, it should be noted that vitur was translated as waiver in Contracts (General Part) Law § 55 (c), 27 L.S'!. 117 (Isr.). Vitur is similarly translated in
the Family Law Amendment (Maintenance) Law, § 12,13 L.S'!. 73 (1959) (lsr.). And in
light of this we examined the meaning of waiver in English Law.
111. Gift Law, § 2, 22 L.S.I 113 (Isr.).
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agreed to the gift, unless he notifies the donor of its rejection
"112

B.

RENUNCIATION AS A BILATERAL ACT

It follows therefore, that renunciation and remlSSlon are
viewed as bilateral acts done without consideration. However,
this does not exhaust the subject. We must examine the language of the law precisely. The law states: '[a] gift may consist
in the donor's renunciation of a right against the donee or in the
donor's remission of an obligation. . . ."113 The law does not say
that every renunciation or remission takes the form of a gift.
The legislature established that there are cases, perhaps many
cases, in which it views renunciation and remission as instances
of gifts to which the Gift Law applies. In drafting the Gift Law,
the legislature considered gifts, and everything is therefore
treated from that perspective. Had the legislature intended to
specifically treat the subject of renunciation and remission, no
doubt it would have begun with a definition along the lines of
section 1 (c) of the Gift Law: '[a] gift is a transfer of the ownership of property otherwise than for consideration."ll4 Thus it
would have added: 'Renunciation is . . . ", and 'Remission is
"
It follows that a person desiring to give a gift may choose to
do so by means of renunciation or remission, and in many instances renunciation and remission will be viewed as gifts. In
those cases, renunciation and remission are done without consideration, and the Gift Law will apply. In such cases, the legislature has clearly established the bilateral, consensual character of
the transaction. lUI But here, too, we must view the matter from
the proper perspective. Weare concerned with a dispositive
norm that, for example, the remission will have valid force by
the donor's unilateral decision alone. Similarly, the parties may
establish that the renunciation and remission shall not be
granted "without consideration" but as a regular transaction for
consideration. As Justice Orr noted:
112.
113.
114.
115.

[d. § 3 (lsr.).
[d. § 1 (c) (Isr.).
[d.
[d. §§ 2 - 3 (Isr.).
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Only when the renunciation is made without
consideration may we view it as a gift. The renouncer of the right must intend to benefit the
receiver, while it must be clear that the renunciation is given without consideration. ll8
Moreover, we find elsewhere that renunciation can be either
for consideration or gratuitous, such as "the gratuitous renunciation of a right."ll7
It follows that in current Israeli law, the character of renunciation is neutral, just as the character of transfer is neutral in
the question of whether the transfer is done for consideration or
gratuitously. The Sale Law1l8 applies in the former case, while
the Gift Law applies in the latter. All is dependent upon the will
of the parties, as it arises from their contract and conduct. So it
is in the case of renunciation and remission. A person may renounce a right within the framework of a larger transaction, in
consideration for a price or other benefit, or he may renounce
the right from a desire to benefit another person. If, for instance,
Reuben wishes to give fifty shekels to each of his four children,
and if one of his children owes him fifty shekels, then Reuben
can remit that debt; the remission will be deemed a gift. Thus "a
gift may consist in the donor's renunciation . . . or the donor's
remission ... " If the parties did not establish otherwise, then
this is a bilateral, legal transaction; it is assumed that the donee
consents.

Thus the character of renunciation is bilateral, as is a transfer. If the remission results from a transaction, then it is clear
that the parties must decide upon the terms. If the transaction
is gratuitous, the presumption of section 3 of the Gift Law will
apply. It is our opinion, that this also should be the preferred
result in the case of renunciation by conduct. Clearly, the presumption of consent is not seen as strong as actual consent, but
such is the nature of unilateral contracts, in which the act of one
party is given greater expression than that of the other.
116. Amina Abed v. Nemni 37(ii) P.O. 606, at 615 (1983) (Jsr.).
117. Land Appreciation Tax Law § 63, 17 L.S.I. 193 (1963) (Jsr.).
118. Sale Law, 17 L.S'!. 193 (Jsr.).
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THE REASON FOR REMISSION

In order to establish which rule shall apply to remission, we,
and the judge, must examine the reason for granting the remission. By this we do not mean the causa in the strict sense employed by various continental systems, but in the sense commonly employed by laymen. In other words, a person may grant
remission: as the result of another, general transaction; because
he is under an obligation to do so (for example, where in a will
to the benefit of A there is a modum obligating him to grant
remission to B); or because he wishes to benefit another. As with
a normal gift, the remitter may stipulate a condition or obligate
the debtor to perform some act in regard to the gift. l19
D.

CONSEQUENCES OF REMISSION AND ITS LIMITS

The discharge of the primary debt, as a result of renunciation or remission, brings with it the discharge of ancillary obligations, such as guarantees, and allows for the removal of real encumbrances, such as mortgages. Clearly, a debtor will be
discharged of his obligations only to the extent set by the
creditor.
E.

RENUNCIATION AND REMISSION BY CONDUCT

The presumption of the beneficiary'S consent enables us to
recognize renunciation and remission by the creditor's conduct.
Indeed, extreme care is necessary to establish that the creditor
actually intended a waiver by the method of renunciation and
remission. At times, a person is willing to accept only part of his
due today, and this readiness, in itself, should not be viewed as a
waiver-by-conduct of the remainder of his rights. 120 "It is well
established, that in order to infer waiver from a person's conduct, that conduct must be clear, emphatic and unambiguOUS."l21 Moreover, the conduct must comprise of "some explicit
119. Gift Law, § 5, 22 L.S'!. 113 (lsr.).
120. We entirely agree with the decision of the Supreme Court in Mizrahi v. Israel,
40(iii) P.D. 163 et seq.(1986) (lsr.). Per J. Goldberg, this case may be viewed as one
wherein "a person acted due to the necessity of the circumstances and not due to the
weighing of the commercial value, which is like a waiver of the remainder of the debt."
121. Ben-Haim v. Cohen, 34(0 P.D. 564, at 570 (1980) (lsr.).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol1/iss1/3

26

Rabello: Renunciation of Right

1994]

RENUNCIATION OF RIGHT

65

expression of actual waiver.Hl22
The returning of an instrument to the debtor by the creditor is a special form of conduct. It is generally presumed that
the debtor received the instrument of the creditor's own will.
However, this will, alone, is not sufficient to discharge the contractual relationship. Rather, it must be accompanied by an intention to relinquish the instrument forever. The person granting the waiver must be cognizant that he held an enforceable
legal right. On the other hand, if the debtor willingly received
the instrument, and his conduct reflected his intention to benefit
from the discharge of the debt, he cannot later withdraw his
consent and refuse the remission.
A waiver of guarantees should not be construed as giving
rise to a presumption of the remission of the entire debt.

F.

THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWAL BY THE REMITTER

In matters of renunciation and remission, different debtors
may have different interests. One may be interested in giving his
immediate consent in the hope that the creditor will no longer
enjoy a right of withdrawal; another may wish to reject the remission and to pay his debt. It is, therefore, important to ascertain at what point a waiver is realized.
From the language of section 3 of the Gift Law, it appears
that the presumption of consent applies only from the moment
that the donee becomes aware of the gift, for the donee's silence
is deemed consent, but not his lack of knowledge. 123 Thus, until
the moment that the beneficiary becomes aware of the remission, the remitter may withdraw. But once the debtor has become aware of the remission, the presumption of consent comes
into force. The creditor can no longer withdraw the remission,
and the debtor can avail himself of a "reasonable time" in which
to consider whether to accept the remission. Should he take no
action during that "reasonable time," the debtor will be deemed
to have consented to the remission.
122. Winter v. Pfeffer, 24(ii) P.D. 541, at 548 (1970) (lsr.).
123. Cf: 2 ZELTNER, supra note 38, at 79; Rabello, supra note 4, § 51; Tilocca, supra
note 67, at 412 et seq.
.
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REJECTION OF REMISSION

We have already had the opportunity to mention that the
debtor enjoys the possibility of refusing a remission. We should
now like to treat this more thoroughly.
If, in every instance of gift, the donee is granted the opportunity to reject the gift by giving notice to the donor within a
reasonable period of becoming aware of the gift,12' then this
right should be even more stringently defended in the case of
remission. Here we speak not of a simple gift, made without the
existence of a prior obligatory relationship between donor and
donee, but of the very opposite. Remission occurs in a creditordebtor relationship, in which the debtor has not yet fulfilled his
obligation.
The possibility of refusing to accept the remlSSlOn is intended to protect the debtor's interest in fulfilling that obligation. That is, it is intended to defend the debto:t:'s interest to be
discharged, not by remission, but by fulfilling his obligation in
some manner that comprises an element of performance and
payment. We are not concerned here with the debtor's interest
in a timely discharge of his obligation,126 although remission,
too, discharges a debt. We are concerned with protecting an interest that differs from discharge, which is the debtor's interest
in performing the contract.
Furthermore, section 40 of the Contracts (General Part)
126
Law
should not create difficulties, primarily because in that
case it is generally not intended that the debt be discharged and
the debtor released from his obligation. Rather, it is to be assumed that the person, who paid the creditor, will have recourse
to the debtor to obtain reimbursement.
It is, therefore, clear that the presumption of consent is
124. Gift Law, § 3, 22 L.S.I 113 Osr.).
125. This interest is protected, inter alia, in §§ 39, 43 (b) Contracts (General Part)
Law; and in §19 Sale Law, which states: 'The buyer shall pay the price to the seller and
shall take delivery of the thing sold."
126. See Contracts (General Part) Law, § 40, 27 L.S.I. Osr.): 'An obligation may be
fulfilled by a person other than the debtor, unless according to the nature of the obligation or to the agreement between the parties, the debtor must fulfill it personally."
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valid only from th~ moment that the debtor is aware of the remission. The debtor's silence is taken to express consent, but not
so his ignorance.
The debtor must express his rejection of the remISSIOn
within a "reasonable time" from his awarenesS, thus nullifying
the presumption of consent. It is not entirely clear whether we
have here a case of suspensory condition or of resolutive condition. On the Continent, too, similar cases have yielded different
solutions. In our opinion, the preferable solution is a resolutive
condition. That is, the presumption of consent comes into force
from the moment that the debtor becomes aware of the remission (section 3 of the Gift Law). And, indeed, a debtor usually
will happily accept the discharge of his debt, and will gratefully
view it as a gift. Therefore, it is desirable to bring about the
consequences of the transaction at this early stage, and thereby
bringing the legal situation in line with what generally occurs
(quod plerumque accidit).l2'1

In light of the above legal construction, it is clear that in the
event of the rejection of a remission, the original obligation is
revived. The discharge of the obligation is not final, but rather
conditional, and the condition can potentially revive the prior
legal relationship. The condition does not act directly upon the
primary transaction, but acts upon the remission alone. The
debtor's rejection cancels the remission; the discharge of the obligation is without force, and the obligation continues ex tunc.
But, absent such rejection, the condition is rendered null after a
reasonable period elapses from the time the debtor becomes
aware of the remission, and the remission comes into force, finally discharging the debtor's obligation.
The rejection of remission enters into force when notice is
received by the grantor, as reflected in section 3 of the Gift Law.
Up to that point, and generally as long as the creditor continues
to stand by his remission, the debtor may withdraw his rejection
and enjoy the remission. 128
Rejection of the remission can be made in any form,
127. See on the burden of notice: Guido Tedeschi, Burden and Frustration 16
335, at 353 et seq. (1987).
128. C{. Estate of Wessner v. Gutman, 229(i) P.O. 315 (1975) (Isr.).
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whether written, oral, or by conduct, such as returning the letter
to the creditor. But rejection may only occur within a reasonable
period. Thus, for example, performance of the obligation immediately following receipt of notice of remission will certainly be
viewed as a rejection of the remission. However, this will not be
the case when the performance is effected after the passage of a
long period of time, under circumstances in which the debtor did
not otherwise inform the creditor of his rejection of the
remISSIOn.
Non-rejection of the remISSIOn is expressed passively, by
conduct that we construe to be consent under section 3 of the
Gift Law. The debtor's inaction therefore finds expression as objective conduct. 129
Rejection of the remission should not be viewed as a form of
renunciation, just as the rejection of a gift should not be so
viewed. Particularly in a system, such as ours, in which the element of consent is emphasized (even as a result of the presumption of consent), the rejection of a remissionor of a gift should be
viewed as expressing a desire not to enter into an agreement,
without attributing to the debtor or donee any other
intention. ISO
The right to reject remission is, in our opinion, afforded to
every primary debtor in the case of multiple debtors. Section
55(c) of the Contracts (General Part) Law establishes: "If the
creditor discharges one of the debtors ... the other is discharged to the same unless .... " Clearly, if the other debtor does
not wish to benefit from the remission, he may employ his right
to reject the remission and its consequences, at least insofar as
he is concerned. Indeed, the discharge of the other debtors is not
a necessary consequence ex lege. The law allows the remitter to
express other desires ("unless a different intention appears from
the discharge") for as many remissions as debtors. In the case of
129. See FRANCESCO SANTORO-PASSARELLI. DOTTRINE GENERALI DEL D!RITTO CIVILE 121
et seq. (Napoli, 1959); PIETRO RESCIGNO. STUD! SULL'ACCOLLO 120 et seq. (Milano, 1958);
KLAUS MANIG. DAS RECHTSWIRKSAME VERHALTEN 279 (Berlin, 1939).
130. By this we reject the theory of FRANCESCO ALLARA. LE FATTISPECIE ESTINTIVE
DEL RAPPORTO OBBLIGATORIO 254 (Torino, 1952), according to which rejection of remission
is 'a type of renunciation of the remission." But see LUIGI FERRI. RINUNZIA E RIFIUTO 20
et seq. (Milano, 1960).
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the rejection of the remission by one of the debtors, the rejection
will be effective only in regard to his part of the debt.
Another question which we shall leave for further study is
whether another creditor of the debtor can reject the debtor's
rejection due to an interest that the creditor may have in releasing the debtor from his obligation. Similarly, we shall leave open
the question of whether a revived debt returns to the same situation that existed before the remission and, especially, whether
the ancillary obligations - such as guarantees - revive, as well.

H.

REMISSIONS AND AN OBLIGATION TO REMIT

The type of remission that we have discussed up to this
point results in the debtor's automatic release from his obligations. Thus, we face an instance of a gift in liberando. The same
result occurs when the donor renounces a specific right toward
the donee, such as in renouncing a security interest or a mortgage. ISI In such cases, the following statement of Maimonides is
apt:
If he remits a debt that he holds against another, or gives him the deposit held by him - it is
a gift that is transferred by oral statement alone,
without need for anything else. lSI

The case is different where, instead of an immediate release
and the real result achieved in that case, the remission or renunciation is expressed as a promise to release the debtor at a later
date. Such a promise - if not undertaken as part of a more general transaction that benefits both sides - is an obligation to
grant a future gift. Such an obligation to release the debtor in
the future requires a written instrument, and the party making
the promise can withdraw it as long as the donee (the debtor)
does not change his situation in reliance thereon. ISS Such a right
of withdrawal does not exist where the remitter waives it in
writing.
131. See also Gabriela Shalev, Promise, Estoppel and Good Faith 16
295, at 321 (1987).
132. Maimonides, 3:3, Laws of Acquisition and Gift.
133. Gift Law, § 5, 22 L.S.!, 113 (Jsr.).
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Similarly, the remitter may withdraw his obligation if the
debtor acts in a disgraceful manner towards him or his family, or
if there is a considerable deterioration of his economic
situation. 134
I.

REMISSION
REMITTER

AS

FULFILLMENT

OF

AN

OBLIGATION

BY

THE

Remission may be granted for numerous reasons. A person
may conclude that he should remit, not as an act of good will,
nor because remission is worthwhile in the framework of his
commercial relationship with the debtor, but because he is obligated to do so due to another obligation that is external to the
creditor-debtor relationship. If, for example, B owes a debt to A,
it is possible, that as part of the obligation, A may find himself
obligated toward C for some payment or to remit B's debt. Thus,
A appears both as creditor and as debtor. He is "obligated" to
remit the debt of the person who is "obligated" to him.
Generally, such situations arise as a result of an obligation
placed upon a beneficiary, as where C establishes in his will that
A will be his heir (or will receive a gift) but that the inheritance
(or gift) is restricted by a modus requiring A to remit B's debt.
Clearly, in such cases the primary debt is discharged only when
the actual remission is effected (and not by the obligation to remit alone, or by placing the duty upon the beneficiary or donee).
In such cases, remission is not granted out of the creditor's
desire to benefit the debtor, but due to his desire to fulfil the
obligation placed upon him by an external source, e.g., from a
preliminary contract of a duty placed upon him by the testator.
Nevertheless, we should not conclude that we face a special instance of remission. In the relationship between A and C, one
remains the creditor and the other the debtor. Remission does
not change its character in accordance with whether the creditor
remitted the debt due to an obligation or of his own free will. In
both cases, the result is the loss of a right, on the one hand, and
the discharge of an obligation, on the other.
In none of the situations we have considered does the
134. [d. § 5 (c).
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debtor become a party to the creditor's obligation, and the
debtor may reject the remission. It is, however, possible that in
the event of a rejection, we may view the rejection as an instance
of the exercise of a right contrary to customary manner and the
requirement of good faith. 136 But this possibility must be approached with care. As Rescigno writes concerning Italian law: 186
The formation of the final contract as performance of the preliminary contract is an act
that is no less obligatory than the performance of
the contract. The only difference is that two parties appear as obligated parties. Therefore, we
must view the act of each party as a separate act,
without confusing it with the act of the other obligated party.IS7

In certain cases, it is possible to view an obligation requiring
a creditor to grant remission as a contract to the benefit of a
third party. 138
J.

TESTAMENTARY REMISSION

There is an instance in which it would appear that the legislature views the remission of an obligation as a unilateral act.
The Succession Law states:
A will can be expressed in terms of gift, release, acknowledgement, or in any other terms. IS9

This is a unilateral act, because a testamentary bequest is a
unilateral, legal transaction. However, we do not face an instance in which the rules of gift or remission apply to such an
act, but just the opposite. The language of the law must be pre135. Contracts (General Part) Law, § 39,27 L.S.I. 117 (lsr.).
136. PIETRO RESCIGNO, INCAPACITA' NATURALE E ADEMPIMENTO 117 (Napoli, 1957).
137. [d. at 119 et seq. For Israeli law cf. Izhak Englard, The Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722 - 1962, in COMMENTARY ON LAWS RELATING TO CONTRACTS, (Guido
Tedeschi ed., in Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1977).
138. Contracts (General Part) Law, §§ 34-38 27 L.S.I. 117 (1973) (lsr.). See also
Gabriela Shalev, Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Party, in COMMENTARY ON LAWS
RELATING TO CONTRACTS, (Guido Tedeschi ed., in Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1977).
139. Succession Law, § 54 (c), 19 L.S.I. 58 (1965) (lsr.).
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cisely construed. What we have here is not a gift or a remission
resulting from the testator's death, as section 8 (b) of the Succession Law states:
A gift made by a person, which is intended to
vest in the donee only upon the death of the donor, is not valid unless it was made by a will in
accordance with the provisions of this Law.140

Therefore, what we have in our example is actually the language of a gift or a remission, when in fact, there is neither a gift
nor a remission, but a will made in that language. Therefore, the
Law of Succession is to be applied here.
K.

FUTURE REMISSION UNDESIRABLE

Up to this point we have considered cases in which a person
remits an existing right or an existing debt. But there are cases
in which a person waives a future right. As for gifts, here, too,
the Gift Law provides no special arrangement.l4l The Family
Law Amendment (Maintenance) Law, 1959, considers waiver of
maintenance payments, stating:
12. (a) An agreement as to, or a waiver of, the
maintenance of a minor does not bind the minor,
so long as it has not been confirmed by the Court.
(b) An agreement as to, or a waiver of, the
maintenance of a person of full age shall be made
in writing; it may be confirmed by the Court.
140. In our opinion, this section of the Succession Law should be given a restricted
interpretation, and it should not be deemed to include gifts of future property. Regarding renunciation, where there are results that are in part inter vivos and in part mortis
causa, the rules of gifts or of succession will apply accordingly. See also Rabello, supra
note 4, at 49; REPORT ON GIFTS § 6 (Civil Code Revision Office, Montreal, 1975): "A gift
which takes effect, partly inter vivos and partly on the death of the donor, is subject to
the rules governing gifts and those governing wills, according to the circumstances." This
Article is based on the second part of Article 77. It makes no mention of 'future property.' This concept is made superfluous as a result of Article I." On the problems arising
today in the identification of future property in Quebec, see H. Roch, Donations, testaments, legs, executeurs testamenta ires in 5 TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL DU QUEBEC 114 et seq.
(Montreal, 1953).
141. Rabello, supra note 4, at 47 et seq.
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13. (a) The Court may vary the provisions of
an agreement, a waiver, or a judgment, if it thinks
fit to do in view of circumstances which have
come to the knowledge of the applicant, or of a
change in circumstances which has occurred, after
the agreement, waiver or judgment . . .

Referencing the Gift Law, Professor Tedeschi has pointed
out that, in [the Israeli] legal system, renunciation can be effected only by agreement.142 Clearly, the Maintenance Law relates to the legal situation that preceded the enactment of the
Gift Law. Following the enactment of that law, the Maintenance
Law must be accordingly construed, and we may state that it
was the legislative intent to distinguish between the case where
a general agreement concerning maintenance is made and the
case where the beneficiary of the maintenance waives it. In such
a case, the agreement can be effected by inaction, as a consequence of the application of section 3 of the Gift Law.
The difficult question that arises is whether renunciation of
maintenance is always permitted, or whether situations exist in
which it is desirable to avoid the force of renunciation, as where
the renouncing party will be bereft of any real support, due to
the renunciation, and will find himself in a situation intolerable
for him or for society. In such a case, the law allows for rectifying the situation through the intervention of the court. Generally speaking, the waiver of future property should be viewed as
a promise to waive a future right, and, therefore, the waiver may
be withdrawn in the event of a considerable deterioration in the
grantor's economic situation or of disgraceful conduct towards
the grantor or his family (section 5(c) of the Gift Law).143
Professor Tedeschi rightly noted that it would be desirable
to completely proscribe renunciation of maintenance, as the possibility for such renunciation often serves as a means for applying pressure in the course of divorce litigation, etc. The legislature has recognized the possibility of precluding renunciation, as
in section 65(a) of the Succession Law, 1965:
142. Guido Tedeschi, Duty of Maintenance in Israel Civil Law, in 6 MISHPATIM 242,
at 247 et seq. (1975).
143. As for renunciation by a minor, Capacity and Guardianship Law, § 20 (3),16
L.S'!. 106 (1962) (Isr.) should also be kept in mind.
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As agreement relating to maintenance under
this Chapter or a waiver thereof, if made in the
lifetime of the deceased, is void, and if made after
his death, requires approval of the Court.

Up to now, we have treated renunciation in favor of a donee, but it is clear that there are situations in which it would be
desirable to prohibit renunciation in favor of the donor and his
creditors, as well. This matter receives partial attention in sec.
63 of the Succession Law. Whatever [Israel's] opinion may be
concerning the possibility of drawing analogies from this
norm,144 it is clearly desirable that a general norm in the form of
the Actio Pauliana treats the issue of whether gifts and renunciations are made to the detriment of creditors.l411

L.

RENUNCIATION AND REMISSION IN THE FUTURE CODE: SOME
COMMENTS DE lURE CONDENDO

From our examination we may conclude that workable solutions can be found in existing laws. The question of whether renunciation and remission are unilateral or bilateral acts is a general one that requires the legislature's decision in favor of one or
the other opinion. In the meantime, the Israeli legislature has
chosen the course of bilaterality, with certain restrictions, and it
does not stand alone in this respect. But what of the future?
For some years now, the Ministry of Justice has been preparing a part of the codification of Israel's civil law. A committee, under the chairmanship of Justice Aharon Barak,146 has
been appointed to review the draft code. In perusing the Draft,
we find that renunciation is first mentioned in Part B ("Contracts, General Provisions"), Chapter 3 ("Performance of Contracts"). Following the provisions regarding set-offs and guarantees, we find section 093 that establishes:
144. Rabello, supra note 4, at 37 et seq.; URIEL PROCACCIA. BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
CIVIL LEGISLATION IN ISRAEL 129 et seq. (Jerusalem, in Hebrew,1984).
145. C. 7.75; D. 42.8.
146. I wish to express my thanks to the Committee Chairman, Prof. Aharon Barak,
for allowing me to quote the Draft.
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Renunciation
(a) Renunciation of a right may be effected
by the creditor's notice to the debtor.
(b) The renunciation is retroactively voided if
the debtor informs the creditor of his rejection
within a reasonable time after receiving the creditor's notice.
It would appear that we have before us a change in direction by the future legislature, by which renunciation is portrayed
as a unilateral act. However, let us continue our examination.
Section 117(c) of the Draft - which parallels section 55(c) of the
Contracts (General Part) Law - states:
If the creditor discharges one of the debtors
of his obligation, he is presumed to have discharged the others, as well.
The explanatory notes explain that the term "waiver, remission, compromise or otherwise have been eliminated as unnecessarily casuistic."
We shall not here consider this particular point, but we note
that the elimination of reference to renunciation, as in sec. 55(c)
of the Contracts (General Part) Law, does not eliminate the institution itself, but seems simply to allow for the discharge of
debtors by means other than renunciation and remission.
Section 208 of the Draft, concerning gifts, states:
Expanding the subject of the gift
A gift may be made by renunciation of a
right or by remission of an obligation.
In order to complete the picture, it should be noted that the
presumption of consent is preserved in regard to gifts. Section
204 states:
It is presumed that the donee agrees to receive the gift. However, the gift is retroactively
nullified if the donee informs the donor of its re-
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jection within a reasonable period after he is informed of it.

Moreover, the presumption of acceptance, presently found
in section 7 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, is preserved
almost verbatim in section 026 of the Draft:
An offer which is exclusively for the benefit
of the offeree is presumed to have been accepted
by him unless he notifies the offeror of his rejection within a reasonable time after receiving it.

From the above examination, it would appear that we are
faced with an internal contradiction. The legislature is free to
choose whatever arrangement it deems fit regarding: offers that
only benefit the offeree; gifts; renunciation; and remission - a
unilateral approach or a consensual approach that requires a
real or supposed meeting of minds by way of a presumption of
consent. But the legislature must be consistent in its choice. In
the Draft there is a glaring contradiction between section 026
and section 093. While the former establishes a presumption of
consent, the latter assumes that we are concerned with a: unilateral, legal transaction, that the beneficiary may reject (by means
of another unilateral, legal transaction). It is difficult to ascertain under what circumstances section 093 would ·have effect, for
if the remission forms part of a more general transaction, clearly
the express consent of the other party is required. But if the
remission is made without consideration, then even before turning to the question of gifts, the presumption of consent under
section 026 will take effect. 147
Although the former case concerns a contract and the latter
a unilateral act, both cases concern transactions that are completed with the debtor's knowledge or upon his receiving notice.
They are conditional upon a subsequent rejection within a reasonable time. It is difficult to establish whether we are faced
147. See the commentary to § 7 of the Contracts Law in Gabriela Shalev, Formation of Contract, in COMMENTARY ON LAWS RELATING TO CONTRACTS, 55 et seq. (Guido
Tedeschi, ed., in Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1977). Among the examples brought by Prof.
Shalev of offers that only benefit the offeree is an offer to discharge a debtor of his debt
(p. 56). However, Shalev's distinction between such an offer and a gift leaves some
doubts in light of § 1 (c) of the Gift Law.
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with a case that falls within the framework of section 026 or section 093. The matter becomes even more complicated when sections 204 and 208 come into play, placing gratuitous remission
within the consensual-bilateral framework. It should be noted
that even under section 093 itself, the Jewish law principle that
"a person is benefitted even in his absence" is not adopted. 148
Let us examine the explanatory notes to section 093:
This is a new provision. Book XII of the
Mejelle "On Settlement and Release" was voided
by section 62(1) of the General Contracts Law, as
it was thought that no further need of it existed.
But arguments have been heard, primarily from
Professor Tedeschi, that a "gap" was thus created. Therefore, it is now suggested that we return to this subject. Instead of mentioning renunciation and remission (which are one and the
same) as was done in the Gift Law, section l(c), it
is now suggested here and also in the chapter on
gifts, to speak of renunciation alone.
Subsection (a): The provision brings only the
principle question of renunciation by unilateral
notice. Of course, this is not to prevent renunciation by way of agreement between the creditor
and the debtor.
Subsection (b): This provision and its phrasing follow sections 26 and 51 above.

It would seem that several factors were not taken into account. First, Professor Tedeschi's comment was made when the
Gift Law was still in draft form and before enactment of the
Contracts (General Part) Law. As we observed, Professor
Tedeschi agrees that after the repeal of section 12 of the Mejelle
renunciation is consensual. 149 In our opinion, renunciation and
remission should not be viewed as equivalent. They are two different legal concepts, even though remission of debts is generally
viewed within the broader framework of renunciation of rights.
But there is a difference between the two, as the vast literature
on the subject attests.1CiO It is, therefore, only proper that section
148. See the discussion of this point in Rabello, supra note 4, at 83 et seq.
149. See supra note 10.
150. We refer to the literature mentioned above. Generally, the term renunciation is
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208 continue to speak of renunciation and remission, the explanatory notes notwithstanding. lIIl
We may, therefore, conclude that the "new provision" that
is urged for the new code has no right to exist in the legal framework that the code itself establishes, unless the legislature excludes sections 026, 204 and 208. But the "future legislature"
does not face a vacuum, as codification is pending. A guiding
principle of law requires that stability and certainty be preserved. Therefore, it is necessary to strive for change only when
the existing law is not compatible with new realities or is wrong
from its inception.
In our opinion, it is necessary to establish a general provision treating the matter of discharge by means of other than the
usual method of discharge through payment. Such means may
include, for example: confusio, compensatio, remissio, novatio
and impossibility that arises after the formation of a contract,
due to causes that cannot be attributed to the debtor. Such a
general provision would allow for broad treatment of the question of discharge of obligations and would also make an important contribution to the theory of contract. In any event, the
attempt to treat the subject of remission in the general part of
the section on contracts, as well, is praiseworthy. In this framework, we would retain the presumption of consent, as established in section 7 of the Contracts (General Part) Law. It seems
to us that the ideas underlying the provision is a contractual
principle that requires a person's consent to acts that appear to
be done entirely for his benefit, while taking into account that,
in practice, in the majority of cases a person accepts that which
used in regard to proprietary rights, such as mortgages, while remission is used in regard
to obligation.
151. We should emphasize that despite the dogmatic difference (unilateral as opposed to bilateral act), in fact there is no difference between the two provisions. On the
basis of § 333 of the law, the remitter notice to the debtor is, in fact, sufficient, and we
have already concluded that, regarding the debtor, the creditor's notice becomes effective
immediately upon its coming to the debtor's notice. Similarly, we have already concluded
that the rejection operates ex tunc, just as is proposed in the case of a unilateral act.
Even at present, renunciation is realized after the creditor's notice to the debtor, taken
together with the presumption of consent! Nevertheless, it is possible that there would
be differences insofar as the date of realization of the renunciation itself, the possibility
of withdrawing the renunciation, the question of the death of either the debtor or creditor, the question of the debtor's capacity, etc. Clearly the legislature did not intend to
bring about changes in these matters.
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is done to his benefit.
In our opinion, we should not draw a distinction between
cases of unilateral acts 1ll2 that require rejection by the beneficiary, and bilateral acts that require consent. The contractual
principle that is expressed by the presumption of consent and
that allows for the donee's rejection of a unilateral benefit
should be a consistent principle throughout the code, while allowing the parties to choose otherwise, should they so desire. In
so doing, the legislature will not change the course already plotted - a path that appears to conform in principle to Jewish law,
as well as to progressive legislation (such as article 1 of section
10 of the Netherlands Civil Code (Book 6».
As we have seen, even in the case of codes, such as the Italian code, which appear to establish a unilateral principle, there
is no lack of jurists who argue that the act is, in fact, bilateral. If
the situation is already clear in our system, why complicate matters? We would waive such a change.

152. We should emphasize that Israeli law recognizes a large number of unilateral
juristic acts, such as: recission due to mistake (§ 14 of the Contracts Law), duress (§ 17)
and extortion (§ 18); a beneficiary's notice of rejection of a right that is his under a
contract to the benefit of a third party (§ 35); appropriation of payments (§ 50); choice
between alternative obligations (§ 51); setting off (§ 53); recission of a contract for
breach (§ 7 of the Contract (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 25 L.S.I. 71 (1970»;
creation of agency by the principal's authorization of the agent (§ 33 of the Agency Law,
19 L.S'!. 231(1965»; etc. See Barak, supra note 7. The matter requires further examination and study.
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